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The life course is part of our taken-for-granted stock of knowledge, even though 
the temporal boundaries of its phases have shifted under pressure from 
changing conditions. A case in point is adolescence. Previously largely 
overlapping with the teen-age period, it has now been extended to cover what 
used to be young adulthood. The reason lies in the way of life of many 
individuals in this age group  (roughly 18-30) which no longer corresponds to 
generally accepted features of adulthood, most particularly economic 
independence and social stability. In the social sciences a sub-category of 
postadolescence has emerged as a label for such lifestyles. In turn, the media 
and marketing professionals have captured the emergent phenomenon labelling 
its progenitors kidults, adultescents, rejuveniles, etc. While implicitly 
acknowledging change, these labels are conservative since they rest on 
established assumptions about what it means to be adult. I challenge this 
position and argue that social forces have propelled young people into patterns 
of action inconceivable to the previous generation. Through this, rather than 
eschewing adulthood per se, they have forged a new adulthood. On both 
theoretical and empirical grounds, I suggest that the putative postadolescents 
do not need to catch up with ‘normal’ adulthood. Rather, we need to develop a 
new understanding of what adulthood means in the social world people are 
facing today – a world which is very different from the one in which the previous 
generation has had its maturity acknowledged. 
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Introduction 
There is a paradox concerning the concept of adulthood in contemporary society. On 
the one hand, in our general cultural discourse adulthood is hardly a mystery: it is the 
taken-for-granted lengthy central period of people’s lives. But on the other hand, there 
is considerable perplexity about this phase of life as a concept that meaningfully frames 
individual lives and normatively supports their actions. In the global north at least, ‘we 
find ourselves asking whether adulthood is a period of stability or change, whether 
adults “develop” or only drift, whether there are patterned “stages” of adult 
development or only more or less successful responses to external pressures’ (Swidler, 
1980:120). In actual living practices, the essence of ‘adulthood’ is elusive. Are 35-year-
olds who (still) live with their parents ‘grown-up’? Is a 28-year-old single woman without 
children who drifts from job to job an ‘adult’? How ‘grown up’ are people in their 
twenties, thirties or beyond who seem to eschew commitment in ‘work and love’, to 
evoke Freud? How mature is a person who appears to live exclusively in and for the 
moment, who accords primacy to ‘experience’ itself rather than to its consolidation? For 
many social commentators in the various media, as well as for social scientists, such 
individuals – kidults, adultescents, delayed adults – are in a state of prolonged 
adolescence and therefore not quite adult. We may ask her: if adolescence can be 
prolonged (eating into what should be, or once was, adulthood), and if adulthood can 
be delayed what, then, is adulthood?  
What is an adult? 
In sociology, there is a lack of focused analyses of the concept of adulthood. At the 
same time, adulthood as a life stage is implicit in most sociological research. From the 
sociology of everyday life to the analyses of global processes; from ethnomethodology 
to systems theory; from Critical Theory to the ‘cultural’ turn; from surveys to narrative 
analysis – everywhere there lurks the shadow of the actor – or subject, or individual – 
who is an ‘adult’. Unless children, adolescents or old people are specifically targeted in 
particular investigations, adult action is the implicit domain under scrutiny in most 
sociological enterprise. The ideal actor in this domain ‘was never a child and seemingly 
came into the world as an adult’ (Elias, 1978: 248). Even where the object of 
investigation is childhood, or adolescence, or old age, adulthood is always present as a 
point of reference, an ever-present default category and a heuristic concept that 
grounds all manner of analysis. 
Adulthood is similarly taken for granted in everyday life. Its long-established markers 
abound in both discourse and practice: a job, marriage, a mortgage, life insurance, 
children, the family car, superannuation, retirement plans, a will. And yet, as already 
pointed out, there are many persons who, in terms of their age, ought to bear those 
markers, but do not do so. So what are these young people who ‘don’t grow up’? More 
importantly, what is this adulthood against an understanding of which we pass such 
judgements, and at what point of the life-course does it begin? Despite the fact that we 
all take adulthood for granted, neither society nor its experts provide answers to such 
questions. 
There are, of course, some official benchmarks to which we can refer: the law sets the 
age of majority, thus bestowing the full gamut of rights and obligations on legal citizens. 
But this does not imply that there is official agreement regarding the age that marks the 
beginning of adulthood. For example, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
differentiates ‘young people’ (15-24) from ‘population’ (25-64) and ‘older persons’ 
(65+). Elsewhere the Australian Bureau of Statistics refers to those less than 35 years 
of age as ‘young people’, while at the same time labelling ‘adult’ everyone beyond 15 
(ABS 2001, 2003, 2004). 
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Such confusion only underlines the point already made: adulthood is still an important 
concept on which our comprehension and calibration of the life course are based. 
Common sense appears to do better than both sociology and officialdom in identifying 
its criteria. As lay participants in everyday life we constantly evaluate and judge, mostly 
by reflex, individuals’ maturity according to various achievements such as coherent 
occupational plans (and full-time employment, at least in principle), stable personal 
relationships, financial and social responsibility, independence, parenthood, and so 
forth. These markers are embedded in western societies’ culture and underlie our 
moral evaluations of individuals as proper adults. They serve as criteria for the social 
recognition of individuals’ ‘full membership in the social system’ (Eisenstadt, 1971: 30), 
or as ‘full partners in interaction’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 113) depending on the 
school of thought.  
The adult ideal 
Let us imagine this scene: a man and a woman in the mid-twenties. The woman holds 
a baby in her arms; a small child clings to the man’s hand. The woman wears an apron, 
the man is in overalls. They stand on the lawn in front of a freshly painted house. There 
is a car in the driveway. No one could ever mistake the woman and the man in this 
picture for adolescents; few would suggest that they might not be adults. We 
comprehend the image, but something in it jars against our knowledge of life as it is 
today. We recognize the picture to be a document of a quite particular period in the 
past. Indeed, no other time in the history of western society has been more conducive 
to the cementing of our conception of adulthood the way it is represented in this 
romantized image than the era Eric Hobsbawm (1995) has called the ‘Golden Age’: the 
time between the end of the Second World War and the oil crises of the early 1970s. 
No other period has provided better conditions for the ideal features of this model of 
adulthood to become lived experience for the majority; no period has shown a more 
faultless synthesis of ideal and reality. 
The social and economic conditions of the period have been extensively discussed and 
analysed and their parameters are well known. What is of importance in this discussion 
is the relatively high degree of standardization of individual lives that was produced by 
these conditions – a standardization which, moreover, went hand-in-hand with an 
overreaching and universally accepted value-system, at least until the rise of discontent 
in the 1960s. Within this value-system, the heterosexual nuclear family prevailed as the 
ideal adult living arrangement that was made possible, to a very large degree, by the 
security and stability provided by the labour market of the time (see Lee, 2001: 7-20). 
It follows that becoming an adult – then – was a matter of following a life course that 
included what I call the classic markers of adulthood: independence, family and work. 
These became objective markers of adulthood and were relatively fixed in time. Most 
importantly, they were achievable for most and supported by an encompassing value-
consensus. When long-term full-time work was within reach for the majority and early 
marriage and parenthood so common, the meaning of being ‘grown up’ was perfectly 
clear, and the attainment of the classic markers of adulthood brought with them social 
recognition of adult status to which I refer as adult recognition (Blatterer, 2005). Real 
individual differences in life experiences notwithstanding, this vision of adulthood held 
secure normative status as the ‘guiding model of adult maturity’ (Lee, 2001: 7). I 
suggest that, to a very large extent, it still does. Our contemporary association of 
adulthood with stability in its various forms has its origins in the experiences and 
expectations of that period which, because of their universality and cohesion, have 
retained much of their cultural indelibility. Passed down from generation to generation, 
the standard model of adulthood is still a powerful ideal. 
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Adulthood postponed 
While standard adulthood as a norm remains robust the very conditions for its 
attainment have disappeared. Again, the circumstances of today are well documented 
and understood. We may thing here about the insecurities of the labour market and its 
increasing casualization, the diversification of living arrangements, the greater 
acceptance of same-sex partnerships and child-rearing arrangements, the escalating 
cost of housing and rampant consumerism. All of us have to contend with the positives 
as well as the negatives of these conditions depending on our economic standing, 
political position, etc. Arguably, however, some of the choices and limits that mark the 
present particularly affect most young people at the brink of the rest of their lives. 
Those of previous generations are generally (though by no means necessarily) more 
securely established and still reap the social and economic benefits of a previous era, 
including some social scientists and media and marketing professionals who are able 
to get their voices heard in the public arena.  
The standard model of adulthood appears still to be alive and well for many of the very 
people who comment upon and analyse social trends of today, particularly those trends 
that are largely driven by younger generations. I am talking, of course, about such 
things as prolonged (relative to 20+ years ago) stay in the parental home, late or 
forfeited marriage and family formation and short-term goals. When these social trends 
are judged against the standard model the conclusion is a fait accompli: an increasing 
number of young people take longer to reach adulthood than was previously the case 
(with the implication, strong or weak, as the case may be, that this is not a good thing). 
In this view, what is problematic is the protracted transition – i.e. the deferral of 
adulthood. What is evidently not considered and questioned, is the nature of adulthood, 
the nature of the assumed destination at journey’s end.  
Everywhere in western democracies there is evidence of this perspective on the young 
generation. Variously, there is talk about the worrying rise of ‘adultescents’ and kidults’ 
in the US and Australia; Nesthocker in Germany, KIPPERS (Kids In Parents’ Pockets 
Eroding Retirement Savings) in the UK, mammone in Italy and ‘boomerang kids’ in 
Canada (Van Dyk, 2000). While the labels peddled by marketing firms and taken up by 
the media are at once colourful and awkward social scientists have evolved more 
sombre concepts to accommodate essentially the same view. In general, these can be 
subsumed under the prolonged adolescence thesis. But if adolescence is indeed 
prolonged, and adulthood is still a sine qua non of full personhood, we need to be able 
to fix a point at which adulthood is at least likely to emerge. And, in fact, such eminent 
US research organizations as the National Academy of Sciences and the Macarthur 
Foundation peg the end of adolescence at 30, and 35 (Danesi, 2003), respectively, 
while the US Society for Adolescent Medicine confidently proposes that adulthood 
begins at 34 (Cue, 2004). Citing an array of authors, Furstenberg (2000) sums up this 
consensus: ‘The transition to adulthood extends well into the third decade of life and is 
not completed by a substantial fraction of young people until their 30s’. 
This phenomenon has long been recognized in the social sciences. For decades, 
academics have noted that young people no longer grow up in the way this has been 
commonly understood. ‘Postadolescence’, first proposed by the Viennese 
psychoanalyst Peter Blos (1941) in the 1940s, is now a common term used to 
encapsulate the stage of life inhabited by individuals who, as Keniston (1970: 634) put 
it some thirty-five years ago, ‘far from seeking the adult prerogative of their 
parents…vehemently demand a virtually indefinite prolongation of their non-adult state.’ 
This line of thinking has been taken up with renewed enthusiasm in more recent times. 
For example: the ‘arrested adulthood’ or ‘youthhood’ of contemporary ‘half-adults’ 
(Côté, 2000); ‘erosion of adulthood’ (Calcutt, 1998); and ‘protraction of youth’ (Furlong, 
2000).  
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The prolonged adolescence thesis is not without a basis in cultural reality: research has 
shown that even quite recently most people have expected that the transition to 
adulthood will – or should – occur between the ages of 21 and 26 (Arnett, 1997; Smith, 
2003). By implication, then, should the transition not take place at that time, what we 
have is the prolongation of the period that (normally) precedes adulthood, i.e. 
adolescence. This is the prevalent view of the day. One dissenting voice gives my 
misgivings about the current orthodoxy a good staring point: 
The idea of a ‘refusal of adulthood’ potentially carries within it the notion that there 
is a ‘normal’ version of adulthood which young people are rejecting. There are 
significant dangers in this interpretation. First, that those that are ‘refusers’ are in 
some ways deviant or ‘other’ and secondly, that there is a fixity in adult status. 
(Maguire et al., 2001) 
Adulthood reconsidered 
The above discussion suggests that ‘adulthood’ needs to be reconceptualized for three 
reasons. These reasons are: first, adulthood has not been analytically defined in the 
first place but only simplistically appropriated from the common-sense cultural 
understanding of it during a particular period in history. Second, its current 
understanding is at variance with practices of persons who have developed well 
beyond the biosocial characteristics of the life course phase of adolescence; and third, 
the standard model is potentially pejorative in relation to a significant number of 
members of society.  
The attempt to redefine adulthood is fraught with difficulties, not the least because it 
provides a vital contrast for our understanding of childhood and old age.  Thus 
Eisenstadt (1971: 30) claims: ‘There is ‘one focal point within the life span of an 
individual which is to some extent emphasized in most known societies, namely the 
achievement of full adult status, or full membership in the social system.’ In western 
societies, such status is symbolized through ‘the ideas of autonomy, self-determination 
and choice‘ (Hockey and James, 1993: 3) – and it is precisely those constitutive 
aspects of what it means to be an adult, a full person and social member, that are 
omitted from our conceptions of childhood, adolescence and old age. Indeed, so 
powerful is the association of full personhood with adulthood that adults who do not 
embody competence aspects of the ideal model, such as individuals with disabilities, 
the frail, the mentally ill, are through the process of infantilization relegated to the 
marginal position of a quasi-childhood. Whether it be the marginalization of the old and 
infirm, the infantilization of women (‘babes’) or non-whites (black ‘boys’); whether it be 
the erstwhile ‘precociousness’ of working class youth and the universalization of the 
middle-class childhood (Gillis, 1981; Perrot, 1997) – adulthood is a metaphor for 
membership in society through acknowledgment of full personhood. Adults are 
individuals who can be full partners in interaction because they are formally as well as 
informally acknowledged and validated as such. 
If, as proponents of the ‘prolonged adolescence’ thesis claim, some young people are 
deferring or even rejecting adulthood, then following from the above argument, those 
attenuated adolescents would also be deferring or rejecting personhood. I suggest that 
this is not the case. Reflection and research have shown that adulthood is actually 
being re-defined, right here before our very eyes while we turn away from this process 
to look backwards for explanations of the mysteries of contemporary existence. 
Research indicates that today markers of transition to adulthood have become 
personalized in terms of individuals’ own placing of their coming into adulthood (Arnett, 
1997, Blatterer, 2005; Du Bois-Reymond, 1998). For some it is attaining their driver’s 
licence and so ‘getting wheels’ as a metaphor of adult autonomy. For others, it may be 
their ‘mature’ handling of an experience of profound trauma. Any number of ‘firsts’ 
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maybe named as signifiers of transition to adulthood. In other words, these personally 
meaningful experiences become deinstitutionalized transition points and therefore do 
not constitute markers of adulthood in the narrow, classic sense.  The ideal model is 
being challenged, and in such a situation it may well be, as it has been proposed, that 
‘people are expected to carve out major aspects of their own adulthoods by means of 
self-directed maturation processes’ and that therefore ‘adulthood is now more a 
psychological state than a social status (Côté, 2000: 31). 
A new perspective  
There seems to be a catch in this line of reasoning: how can we reconcile this 
personalization of adulthood with the view that the achievement of adult status relies on 
social (that is, collective) recognition? Conceptual inroads can be made if we consider 
that being a full partner in interaction is by definition contingent on intersubjective 
processes of social recognition. The particular manner in which this institutionalization 
is effected always depends on social circumstances in which interaction generally 
takes place (Honneth, 1996). From this perspective the personalization of adulthood 
has its limits; it can only to a limited degree be subject to individual decision-making 
and personal perception. Generalizing somewhat, the circumstances under which 
processes of social recognition as full members of society unfold are today much more 
fluid and indeterminate than has been the case at the time when the standard model of 
adulthood was carved out. From negotiated personal relationships in cohabitation, 
family life and parenting to the vagaries of the labour market, from the caprice of 
fashion in commodities and entertainment to political concerns of globalization, we face 
a fluid social world and cultural scene in which flexibility and mobility are desirable 
personal characteristics. There is evidence that younger people have not only adapted 
to these conditions but have also embraced them, in the sense that desire for stability 
appears to be on the wane (Du Bois-Reymond, 1998; Wyn and White, 2000; Blatterer 
2005). 
Therefore objective, externalized, markers of adulthood may be constraining, rather 
than enabling, under present conditions. Subjective benchmarks, on the other hand, 
may increase individuals’ chances for social recognition as full partners in interaction 
especially, but by no means exclusively, for persons in their twenties and thirties. The 
more the social imperative of flexibility becomes normalized and taken for granted, the 
more likely it is that criteria for the recognition of adult status will be in accord with this 
imperative – and that means persons who are open and amenable to change and 
tolerant of both external and internal instability and flux. If pressed to specify a point of 
transition to adulthood, such individuals are likely to choose a subjectively meaningful 
experience that signifies, to them, autonomy and adaptability. 
The redefinition of contemporary adulthood can thus be situated in the prevalent fluidity 
and pluralization of the interactions in which recognition is now embedded. There is 
considerable tension in this situation since adulthood as a social category has for so 
long meant the exact opposite of a fluid and indeterminate way of being in the world 
and still resonates, in the culture, with ‘settling down’, acquiring a stable social profile, 
carving out one’s life trajectory in terms of long term goals, and so forth. Today, 
individuals’ ability to be full persons in interaction – and thus to be in the running to be 
recognized as adults - is at least partly linked to their competence in negotiating their 
biographies. This is a task the work of which has to be done in the context of the 
contemporary ‘fragility of bonds … in-built transience and ‘until-further-noticeness’, 
coupled with temporariness of commitment and revocability of obligations’ (Bauman, 
2001: 137).  The implication here is that the normative basis for adulthood is no longer 
clear, since the established collective markers of the transition to adulthood have 
disappeared as factual aspects of the social reality of today, and are in the process of 
losing their significance. Their cultural foothold has been so secure, however, that a 
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new understanding of the transition to adulthood has not as yet emerged in a coherent 
way. We are not yet fully aware that, far from being suspended in a state of prolonged 
adolescence, our young new adults are actually very well integrated into their social 
world. 
Nonetheless, their situation is still riven by contradictions. Individuals’ practices may be 
at once structurally rewarded but discursively misrecognized because the normative 
ideal of another time remains dominant in the cultural imagery of adulthood. Yet this 
may not be altogether a bad thing. If indeed we live in times of rapid and, more 
importantly, diversified and confusing social changes, then these contradictions can 
serve to test the limits of the normative lag to which most of us are prone, and prompt 
us into looking at the world in which we live with fresh eyes. Crucially, the sociological 
study of the redefinition of contemporary adulthood can not only illuminate the lag 
between societal expectations and the real possiblities for their realization, but it brings 
home the fact that social change is constant, and that this constancy springs from the 
often unremarkable actions and practices of ‘ordinary’ people who attempt to make 
sense of an increasingly complex social environment. In so doing the new adults of 
today assert their personhood as matchless actors in times of uncertainty. 
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